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27 February 1964

Copy No, C 27-9

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007500250001-1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007500250001-1

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\*Rumania - Communist China: Rumania's acceptance of Communist China's invitation to send a top-level party delegation to Peiping in early March was probably motivated by a desire to find some means of lessening the tensions in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The Rumanians, like other parties in the international Communist movement, may be deeply concerned over recent developments in the dispute. There have been unconfirmed reports recently that Moscow was on the verge of a final split with Peiping. The Eastern European countries have long been fearful of such an eventuality, believing that one consequence would be a return by Moscow to much closer supervision of their affairs.

Bucharest's move may have been in the making for some time. A month ago Deputy Premier and Politburo member Bodnaras told the US Minister that there would be more examples of Rumanian "un-orthodoxy" in relations with the bloc and non-bloc world. It is unlikely, however, that Bucharest's decision to go to Peiping marks a Rumanian intention to align itself with the Chinese Communists for whom they have not generally shown ideological affinity.

Bucharest's decision to talk with the Chinese Communists, if made without Moscow's blessing, could further complicate the USSR's leadership of the Soviet bloc. During the past year Rumania had already set a precedent by successfully resisting Soviet efforts to bring about a change in Rumania's own national economic plans.

In any event, Peiping will represent this forthcoming meeting as a signal success and a new intrusion into the facade of Soviet bloc unity. The Rumanians will be the first high-level delegation from

Eastern Europe to Peiping in several years. This will add to Communist China's prestige in the Communist world and complicate Moscow's efforts to isolate Peiping. Because the Chinese Communists have made clear they have no intention of easing their adamant stand in the dispute with Moscow, however, little more than a bland and meaningless communiqué is likely to be forthcoming from the discussions with the Rumanians.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Dominican Republic: A new amnesty law being pushed by triumvirate president Donald Reid Cabral is causing a bitter dispute within the government.

This law, scheduled to be promulgated today, allegedly would grant an amnesty to a large number of Castro-Communist militants currently in jail or exile, and to many persons associated with the despotic Trujillo regime. Among the latter are numerous Dominican military officers and exiled former President Joaquin Balaguer.

Pressure to withdraw the law is being exerted by the other triumvirs, with strong backing from key political and military elements. In addition to objecting to the release of the extreme leftists, foes of the law are said to be united in opposition to the return of Balaguer, whom they fear may seek the presidency next year.

One Balaguer supporter told the US consul at Santiago on 24 February that Reid has agreed to the exclusion of Balaguer, who is the presidential choice of many armed forces leaders, and that such a move could bring a military coup. Balaguer recently said he might return to the Dominican Republic immediately "if a new crisis develops."

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NOTES

Lebanon: [President Shihab is considering re-  
maining in office for another term, despite the pres-  
ent constitutional prohibitions against such action.  
Shihab has told US Ambassador Meyer that he would  
await the outcome of parliamentary elections, which  
end on 3 May, before making his final decision. It  
appeared previously that Shihab would not try to suc-  
ceed himself, although many Lebanese believe he is  
the only leader who can save the country from the kind  
of factional strife that led to the civil war of 1958.]

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\*South Vietnam: Belief in the inevitability of a  
Viet Cong victory is becoming increasingly widespread  
among the large Chinese community in Saigon. Lack  
of faith in the Vietnamese government's ability, uncer-  
tainty over US intentions, and accelerated Communist  
subversive activity are having a broad impact among  
the Chinese. The US Embassy comments that should  
Chinese morale deteriorate further, increasing covert  
aid to the Communists from this economically impor-  
tant quarter could become a significant factor.

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